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sports
n late spring of 1987, I received a
telephone call that changed my law prac-
tice. Jerry Colangelo, General Manager of the Suns
since its arrival in Phoenix as an expansion NBA franchise
in 1969, called me to discuss representing a group of inves-
tors he was putting together for the purchase of the franchise. At the time, the Suns franchise was the only major
professional sports team in Arizona and had been very successful. Unfortunately, the reputation of the team, care-
fully nurtured from its arrival, recently had been tarnished by allegations and investigations concerning drugs. Jerry
explained that the Tucson and California owners of the Suns were considering selling the franchise or moving it from
Phoenix. True to an unwritten understanding with the owners, Jerry was being given an opportunity to buy the fran-
chise if he could meet the price the owners had set. Jerry recounted that he had begun contacting investors by meet-
ing with John W. Teets, Chairman of the Board and CEO of The Greyhound Corporation, and Greyhound's General
Counsel, L. Gene Lemon. He proposed that Greyhound consider becoming a lead investor. During the discussions
with Greyhound, I had been recommended to assist in putting together the investment group. Having just received
the call from John Teets that he was waiting for-confirming that the
Board of Directors of Greyhound had voted to put up $6 million for a 25 per- I N S I D E T H E
cent interest in the team-Jerry thought it was time for me to get involved. B OX
I had moved my family to Phoenix in 1972 after obtaining an L.L.M. O W NER'S
from the Graduate Tax Program at New York University. By 1987, I was C
primarily a transactional lawyer and it was as a result of several large W IT C OUNSEL
projects for Greyhound that I became involved with the Suns. Except for TO J E R RY
a few areas (such as the organization and structure of the professional
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leagues and associations, player
contracting and certain aspects of
arena and stadium development
matters), "sports law" differs very lit-
tle from any other business practice.
Needless to say, with its increasing
popularity, the markets for related
merchandise and business interest in
seeking sponsorship and promotion
opportunities, professional sports has
become big business. This article cov-
ers my involvement in Phoenix during
what has been a period of unprece-
dented growth.
My wife and I already knew Jerry
and Joan Colangelo socially. They
were very active in the community
and, under Jerry's leadership, the
Phoenix Suns seemed to support
every worthwhile cause in town. 1 In
Phoenix, Jerry was the Phoenix
Suns. He had committed 17 years of
his life to the franchise and had
earned a reputation for hard work
and marketing genius. His integrity
and business ethics were above
reproach. Nonetheless, with the
drug controversy and the team suf-
fering through one of its most disap-
pointing years on the court, the ques-
tion was whether his ambition was
realistic. While Jerry had been very
successful with the Suns and in real
estate, he was of limited personal
means (certainly in comparison with
the controlling interests of other pro-
fessional sports franchises), and I
was soon to learn that he had agreed
to pay the highest price ever for an
NBA franchise.
CLOSING THE DEAL
When we met, Jerry explained the
Greyhound investment and the com-
mitment of the Arizona Bank for a
substantial loan if the balance of the
$44.5 million purchase price could be
raised. The meeting went well and
we discussed the various steps that
would have to be taken in order to
purchase the franchise. I had the
distinct impression that he would
prefer to do the deal on a handshake,
but was resigned to the need for
lawyers to become involved. A dead-
line for early October had been set in
order to close the deal and afford new
ownership sufficient time to prepare
for the 1987-88 NBA season.
We quickly began work forming an
Arizona corporation (to be the gener-
al partner) and a Delaware limited
partnership (to be the owner and
operator of the franchise); began the
preparation of subscription informa-
tion for investors; and started negoti-
ations with the Arizona Bank. At the
same time, work was underway to
prepare the agreement for purchas-
ing the assets comprising the fran-
chise; to obtain NBA approvals 2 of
the newly formed limited partner-
ship, its general partner and
investors as they signed up; and to
draft the host of other agreements
and documents necessary to com-
plete the project. The principal
assets of the team consisted of player
contracts, trademarks and trade
names, participation rights in the
NBA and affiliated organizations,
season ticket deposits, local broadcast
and telecast contracts, advertising and
sponsorship agreements, merchan-
dise, and an office and facility lease
(the Veterans Memorial Coliseum).
With the commitments of
Greyhound and the Bank, Jerry had
early success in generating interest
among other investors. Pinnacle
West, through its investment sub-
sidiary, committed to $3 million and
Ross Farnsworth, a successful Mesa,
Arizona real estate developer, com-
mitted to $4 million. Other smaller
investors came on board and, for a
while, it looked like smooth sailing.
As the deadline approached, signs
began to appear that certain early
and substantial expressions of inter-
est by two prominent Phoenix-based
companies might be unraveling.
Things came to a head one afternoon
in our offices, shortly before the
scheduled closing. What we hoped
would be a wrap-up meeting with
executives of these investors was not
going well. After covering where he
stood with the Bank and other
investors and after sharing his
expectations for the franchise, Jerry
asked for their commitment in order
to help close the deal. The executives
asked for time to discuss the matter
privately and adjourned to separate
conference rooms. About a half hour
later they returned and announced
that they were sorry but had to pull
out of the deal. As they got up to
leave, Jerry remained seated and
crumpled up in a ball several pieces
of paper that were in front of him.
In a single movement, he swiveled in
his chair and tossed the crumpled
paper the length of the large confer-
ence room toward a small waste bas-
ket. I will never know how he made
that shot. No one said a word.
We stayed at the office for hours
discussing how to fill the gap. We
ran through our list of existing
investors, we considered additions to
the list-though time was very
short-and we considered options
with the ownership of the franchise
(which was insisting on being bought
out entirely). Late in the evening, I
rejoined Jerry in our conference
room. He had wanted to be alone.
With no options readily apparent, I
struggled for words. This was more
than a business deal gone bad-I had
become infected with Jerry's passion
and he deserved to succeed. When he
left our offices late that night, he said
it was not over-but for the life of
me, I did not see a solution.
The next morning, the sun was
shining and the clouds had lifted.
Jerry called and said "It's a go." In
early morning conversations, he had
convinced the owners of the franchise
to stay on as limited partners in the
As if there was some urgency
new partnership and
carry back some debt. only i
The rest, Jerry made up
by borrowing to purchase that
the two remaining limit-
ed partnership units. closed
The elation of the
moment quickly gave way
to around-the-clock work
to restructure the deal.
In addition to Jerry's
waste basket "hoop," several unusual
things occurred during the acquisi-
tion of the franchise. We expected
that some investors might insist on
burdensome constraints on manage-
ment and in the course of resisting
these efforts, Teets and Greyhound
became a staunch ally. They pointed
out, matter-of-factly, that none of the
investors, including Greyhound,
knew the first thing about running a
professional basketball franchise.
Teets made it clear that Greyhound
was investing in Jerry and Jerry
must have the authority to make it
work. 3  The other unusual occur-
rence was a matter of timing. There
had to be a lot of last-minute legal
work to effectuate the restructuring
of the deal. As a result, there was
considerable sentiment (especially
among some of the lawyers) for post-
poning the scheduled closing. As if
there was some urgency only he per-
ceived, Jerry insisted that we meet
the deadline. We closed the pur-
chase, as scheduled, on October 14,
1987. Days later, Black Monday
hit-had we delayed, all might yet
have been lost as uncertainty set in
throughout the business community.
Jerry's deal with his new investors
was pretty straightforward. He
would operate the franchise and
make all management decisions.
Limited partner approvals would
only be required for major events,
such as borrowing in excess of a lib-
eral cap, a move of the franchise from
Phoenix, the sale of the franchise, or
ie perceived, Jerry " "
we meet the deadline.
the purchase, as sched
on October 14, 1987.
s later, Black Monday
dissolution of the partnership. An
advisory committee of limited part-
ners was established to meet with
Jerry once or twice a year to discuss
the affairs of the business. When the
limited partnership repaid investors
their capital, plus a stated annual
return on their investment, the
General Partner's interest would
increase from one to 25 percent.
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THE GREAT TURNAROUND
With the team coming off one of its
worst seasons, an uncertain local and
national economy, and new investors
watching (a few nervously), it
seemed reasonable to expect that
Jerry would move cautiously.
Instead, he and Cotton Fitzsimmons
(who was brought back to the Suns
shortly after closing the purchase of
the franchise) worked feverishly to
remake the team. At the beginning
of the 1987-88 season, only two play-
ers would remain from the 1986-87
roster. Trade rumors swirled and
it seemed that announcements were
being made almost weekly. The key
decisions involved trading Phoenix's
best player, Larry Nance, to
Cleveland for three relatively
obscure players, Kevin Johnson (in
his second year in the NBA and a rel-
atively inexperienced back-up point
guard), Ty Corbin, and Mark West.
None seemed to offer the potential of
a Larry Nance, regarded widely as
one of the premier forwards in pro-
fessional basketball. The other con-




Chambers, one of the
NBA's first free agents.
There was a great deal of
speculation by the fans
and the sports writers
about Chambers. While
recognized as a player with
tremendous talent, he had a
reputation in some quarters
it. for inconsistency.
The 1987-88 team pro-
duced 55 victories. Coming off a 28-
54 season, it was one of the greatest
turnarounds in NBA history. The
team reached the Western
Conference Finals and Jerry could do
no wrong. After the 1987-88 season,
Jerry was recognized an unprece-
dented third time as NBA Executive
of the Year. The 1987-88 season
would turn out to be the start of ten
consecutive seasons during which
the team made the NBA playoffs.
Kevin Johnson emerged as one of the
best point guards in the NBA and
Tom Chambers proved to be a great
addition at forward, making people
forget the Nance trade except for the
fact that it brought us Kevin
Johnson. While there were many
naysayers when the franchise was
purchased for $44.5 million (too
much to pay for any basketball
team), those voices soon became muf-
fled by the success of the new team.5
The franchise moved quickly to take
marketing advantage of its on-the-
court success. No matter how opin-
ions about Jerry may differ, I have
never heard anyone doubt that he is
at the head of the line when it comes
to marketing professional sports. 6
The Suns were one of the few pos-
itive stories as Phoenix suffered
through difficult economic and politi-
cal times. The franchise seemed to
be on a steady course when Jerry
decided the time was right to make a
move that would insure its future.
When information was being pre-
pared for prospective investors in the
franchise, Jerry insisted that there
be included his commitment to a new
arena. At the time, it sounded like
long, long-range planning, but Jerry
soon began giving voice to the idea at
speaking engagements. Denny
Moss, Director of Economic Develop-
ment for the City of Phoenix, heard
Jerry speak and called to discuss the
idea of a downtown arena.
"LET'S GET TO WORK"
When I moved to Phoenix in 1972,
downtown was a wasteland.
Commercial and retail was dying
out. Government buildings, bank
headquarters and the courts were
the only notable presences. Soon
after 5:00 p.m., the streets were
deserted. Vagrancy, crime, and the
blight that accompanies them
seemed to be all that was flourishing,
despite the efforts of city councils, may-
ors, and vested downtown interests.
By 1989, there were a few signs of
an awakening in downtown. The city
had invested heavily in a much
under-utilized convention center. A
Hyatt hotel was constructed and the
"old Adams Hotel" was gutted and
rebuilt. Pinnacle West was under
construction on the Arizona Center,
a gamble to reintroduce retail and
restaurants to the downtown area. A
hard-fought battle over taxes to
develop a freeway system with much
better access to downtown finally
had been won. While some pieces
were coming together, there still was
no spark to ignite the imagination
and spur activity.
Over a several-month period,
Jerry engaged in meetings with the
Mayor, Terry Goddard, and City staff
("City"). A rough outline was devel-
oped for a public/private partnership
to construct a downtown multi-pur-
pose sports and entertainment facili-
ty that would serve as the home of
the Phoenix Suns. I was sitting in
my office one afternoon when Jerry
called to say that he and the City
were ready to move forward. In
almost the same breath, he told me
that one of his investment partners
had asked him to meet with another
law firm about representing the Suns
on the project. Jerry said he owed it
to his investment partner to have the
meeting and he did not want me to
hear about it through the grapevine.
It was an anxious and nervous sever-
al days. Our next conversation
began, in typical Colangelo fashion,
with "Let's get to work." Warning me
about rumors that I, in fact, had
heard concerning his meeting with
another law firm was a decent thing to
do that, in my experience, would not
have been considered by many clients.
LAYING THE ARENA'S LEGAL
FOUNDATION
The arena negotiating team began
meeting in early 1989. The City was
represented by Denny Moss, outside
counsel and a representative from
the City Attorney's office. Bob
Machen, whom Jerry had selected to
be in charge of development and
operation of the new arena, Rich
Dozer, then Chief Financial Officer of
the Suns and now president of the
Diamondbacks, and I all represented
the Suns. For several months, we
put together the key points to the
deal and on March 24, 1989, the
Mayor and City Council were pre-
sented for approval the Downtown
Sports Arena Memorandum of
Understanding ("MOU").
The MOU described a multi-pur-
pose arena having a seating capacity
of approximately 18,000, an attached
parking garage, and other improve-
ments. The arena would be owned by
the City but would be developed and
operated, under long-term agree-
ments with the City, by Phoenix
Arena Development Limited
Partnership (the developer/operator),
a Colangelo-controlled Delaware lim-
ited partnership, of which the fran-
chise is the 99 percent limited part-
ner. Three possible downtown sites
were identified for the City to pur-
chase and prepare for development,
all of which complied with environ-
mental and historic preservation
laws. The developer/operator would
select the architects, design the
arena and related facilities, and
supervise construction. A construc-
tion manager would be jointly select-
ed and construction contracts would
comply with the City's public bidding
requirements. In addition to the cost
of the site and site preparation,
the City agreed to provide a maxi-
mum of $35 million towards the con-
struction costs of the arena, the park-
ing garage, and related infrastructure.
The developer/operator was
required to obtain debt financing for
all additional funds, then estimated
to be $35 million, and would be sole-
ly responsible for repaying the debt
from arena revenues and other
sources. Cost overruns would be the
responsibility of the developer/opera-
tor. No lien or encumbrance of any
kind would be permitted on the
arena improvements or the site.
The developer/operator also
agreed to enter into a long-term
arrangement with the City to man-
age and operate the arena. After
operating expenses, the funding of a
repair and replacement reserve, and
debt service, the City would receive a
priority payment during the first 30
years of $500,000 per year (increas-
ing by 3 percent each year) and 70
percent of net cash flow. Remaining
net cash flow represented the devel-
oper/operator's profit. After the ini-
tial 30 years (assuming the arena
had not become obsolete), the devel-
oper/operator would continue to
operate the project for ten years with
no priority payment to the City and
with the City receiving 60 percent of
net cash flow. The City, subject to
The cornerstone has been solid
legal requirements and
with certain exceptions, oran
agreed not to participate
financially in the develop- not (
ment of any other arena
or arena-like facility that produ
could compete for events.
The Suns would enter the s
into a long-term, iron-clad
agreement with the devel- the
oper/operator to play all
of their NBA home games
at the arena and would
maintain practice and work-out facil-
ities, a store for the sale of team mer-
chandise, and their business offices
at the arena. The Suns also agreed
to market the private suites in the
arena (88 in number) and all perma-
nent arena advertising during the
first 30 years of the arrangements for
60 percent of all gross revenues
derived from licensing of the suites
and arena advertising sales.
The right of the Suns to these pay-
ments was subordinate only to oper-
ating expenses, funding the repair
and replacement account, debt serv-
ice, and the City's priority payment.
The agreement granted to the City
the right to use the arena, at cost, for
conventions, civic events, and other
activities. These rights included 50
priority reserve dates and the right
to use the arena on any other day
that it was not committed to another
event. Two sets of projections were
submitted with the MOU, one based on
a mix of events averaging 220 per year
and the other based on an average of
185 per year. An opinion of Public
Financial Management, Inc. (financial
and investment advisors to the project)
accompanied the projections.
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After approval of the MOU by the
City Council, work began immediate-
ly on definitive documents. While
public reaction to the deal was large-
ly positive (with the help of the team,
which was working its way towards
another 55-win season), dissident
ization and management
)nly in the selection of the
ct and its marketing, but in
ustainable development of
franchise by attracting top
coaches and athletes.
voices began to be heard. There were
objections to the City's investment in
the project through an increase in
the hotel-motel tax and the car-
rental tax; groups with various social
concerns spoke out about the City's
spending priorities; and those funda-
mentally opposed to spending public
money to benefit professional sports
teams became quite vocal. Petitions
began circulating to limit the City's
participation in arenas and stadi-
ums-placing a great deal of pres-
sure on the arena negotiating team
to quickly present definitive docu-
ments for City Council approval. 8
Under Arizona law, a city ordinance,
even if enacted by referendum, may
not be applied retroactively to undo a
transaction lawfully entered into
where the parties rely upon their
agreements and substantially per-
form. A referendum vote could not
take place before the fall of 1989-
the definitive documents would have
to be completed by the early summer
and substantial work would have to
begin on site acquisition, prepara-
tion, and planning in order to render
the project safe from challenge.
9
Early during what became pro-
tracted negotiating and drafting ses-
sions, the parties set a deadline of
June for completion of all document
preparation. While that date
slipped, all necessary approvals were
received (including the vote of the
City Council) and the documents
were signed on July 19,
1989. During negotiations
with the City, the financial
management consultants
worked on a financing pro-
posal and began shopping
it. To my knowledge, this
was the first project of its
kind proposing substantial
private financing secured
solely by revenues, with no
rights in the physical
assets comprising the proj-
ect. The concept was unacceptable to
a number of institutions that early
had expressed interest. In the end,
The Fuji Bank, through its San
Francisco Agency, offered its commit-
ment if certain other pieces could be
put in place. Fuji's commitment left
approximately $5 million of construc-
tion costs unpaid. In addition, the
financial plan assumed the conces-
sionaire would pay the costs of build-
out and equipment for concession
space and a proposed bar and restau-
rant. Finally, the financial plan con-
tained no provision for construction
cost overruns. These loose ends
came together through a public bid
process which identified The Dial
Corp (formerly Greyhound), through
its subsidiary, Restaura, Inc., as a $5
million lender to the project, the
exclusive food and beverage conces-
sionaire at the arena (responsible for
building out and equipping all food
and beverage space) and the guaran-
tor of up to $6 million in construction
cost overruns.
A TANGLE OF PRIORITIES
Where the arena money came
from is fairly easy to explain. How
construction funds would be dis-
bursed, however, and how arena rev-
enues would be paid were the subject
of difficult negotiations and complex
arrangements. The concerns of the
City included protecting its priority
payment and making sure that its
bond funds were not disbursed or
used for purposes that would contra-
vene applicable requirements. Fuji
was agreeable to the priorities for
operating expenses (including the
overhead of the operator) and fund-
ing for repair and replacement, but
wanted first call on every other dol-
lar of revenue. The Dial Corp and
Restaura, with respect to their $5
million loan and cost overrun
advances, investment in concession
area build out and equipment and
interest in concession revenues,
wanted to share arena revenues
(after operating expense and funding
for capital improvements) pro rata
with Fuji. The franchise was pro-
tective of the priority established for
its fees for the marketing of adver-
tising and suite licenses while at the
same time sought to maintain maxi-
mum flexibility in the control of the
facility through its affiliate, the devel-
oper/operator.
Negotiations to put the financing
for the arena (with naming rights
successfully marketed, the America
West Arena) in place were protracted
and difficult due to the number of
parties involved and their competing
interests. 10  Most of the private
financing came from the sale of
taxable variable-rate bonds issued
by the Industrial Development
Authority of Maricopa County.
The bonds were backed by Fuji's
direct draw letter of credit in the ini-
tial stated amount of approximately
$45,000,000. Fuji would make liq-
uidity advances to bond holders pur-
suant to the letter of credit with
repayment by the Arena on the same
date. Several reserve accounts were
established and funded, primarily
with advance deposits from the early
marketing of suites. In addition, the
Arena was required to fund a work-
ing capital reserve to pay operating
expenses in the event cash flow
proved inadequate. The Arena, with
City approval, granted Fuji a securi-
ty interest in all contracts relating to
the financing, construction, develop-
ment, use and operation of the facili-
ty-including its agreements with
the City, its agreements with
Dial/Restaura, its agreements with
the Suns, the naming agreement,
major advertising contracts, and
suite license agreements. In the
event of a default, the developer/
operator could be removed; however,
all of the rights and obligations of the
developer/operator of the Arena,
including the Arena's obligations to
the Suns, were required to be
assumed by the interim operator
and, ultimately, a replacement oper-
ator to be selected by the parties.
The Dial/Restaura loan agreement
set forth procedures for obtaining
advances against the $5 million loan
commitment as well as advances
against the $6 million cost overrun
facility. Under a related concession
agreement, Restaura would collect
all food and beverage gross revenues.
Against these collections, Restaura
was permitted to withhold from the
Arena's share 10 percent of gross
receipts plus an additional amount
for each $1 million advanced pur-
suant to the cost overrun guaranty.
Provision was also made in the loan
and concession agreements for
repayment of the depreciated costs of
concessionaire build out and equip-
ment in the event of termination of
the concession agreement. In the
event of a payment default with
respect to Fuji, Restaura was subject
to a limited pay back obligation.
Notwithstanding a default in the
obligations to Dial/Restaura, no
acceleration of Arena obligations was
permitted without Fuji's consent.
All of the rights and obligations of
the various parties involved in the
Arena's financing and operation were
pulled together in the Interparty
Agreement by and between the
developer/operator, the Suns, the
City, Fuji, Dial/Restaura, the various
banks holding reserve accounts and
the entity formed by the City of
Phoenix to act as interim operator.
The principal purpose of the
Interparty Agreement was to set
forth the various priorities for appli-
cation and payment of facility rev-
enues in the absence of default as
well as in the event of defaults under
any or all of the financing arrange-
ments or other key agreements for
the operation of the Arena and the
playing of Suns home games at the
Arena. What was, as between the
City and the developer/operator, a
fairly simple outline for disbursing
Arena revenues became excruciating-
ly complex arrangements to address
the payment of competing obliga-
tions, with variations in priorities to
take into account the various defaults
that might occur. Special provisions
applied during construction to take
into account untoward events and
failures to maintain the schedule for
development and construction.1 1
The Arena site was acquired by
the City by late summer 1989, and
work was begun immediately (using
proceeds from the sale of the City's
bonds) for infrastructure and site
preparation. Groundbreaking for the
Arena occurred in 1990. It was an
ideal time to be building an arena-
the local economy was in the dol-
drums and major construction was at
a near standstill. Every major con-
tractor in Arizona bid on the project
at substantially below the most opti-
mistic estimates of the construction
manager. This permitted adding
additional seating and many aesthet-
ic features to the Arena not included
in the original design. The Arena
officially opened on June 5, 1992,
several months ahead of schedule.
Approximately 25 new restaurants
and retail outlets opened in down-
town Phoenix within 12 months, and
existing downtown businesses
expanded. The City finally had an
attraction that would bring people
back to the downtown area, and,
with streetscapes and other improve-
ments, downtown began to take on the
attributes of a popular destination.
THE PLAY-BY-PLAY OF ARENA
DEVELOPMENT
1. Jerry instructed the arena
negotiating team at the outset of
negotiations with the City that he
had committed the Suns to the Arena
and that we should not resist any
recourse the City might seek if the Suns
threatened to leave or left the Arena
prior to the end of its commitment.
2. Although it was not at all
clear that we would be successful,
our instructions were also to safe-
guard the franchise from Arena fail-
ures. By pre-selling naming rights,
long-term advertising and suite
licenses, we were able to assure rev-
enue streams which, together with
the City's commitment of funds to
Arena development and construc-
tion, allowed us to achieve that objec-
tive by limiting recourse on financing
obligations to Arena revenues and
the developer/operator. In addition,
the franchise's principal revenue
streams were tied to gross revenues
from advertising and suite licenses.
Not only was the franchise well-
equipped (in the person of Harvey
Shank, Vice President of Marketing)
to do this, but the revenue expecta-
tions of the franchise were not
dependent on the bottom line per-
formance of the Arena and the obli-
gations to the Suns would be
assumed by any successor to the
developer/operator, if removed due to
Arena defaults.
3. In structuring arrangements
between the City and the develop-
er/operator for the Arena, a great
deal of attention was paid to proper-
ty taxes. In 1989, Arizona taxed pos-
sessory interests in publicly owned
property. The "Operating Agree-
ment" structure, rather than a
ground lease arrangement, was
selected to avoid characterizing the
developer/operator's interest in the
Arena as a possessory interest, even
though several exemptions from the
tax on possessory interests were
applicable. Subsequently, provisions
of the favorable property tax applica-
ble to government-owned arenas and
stadiums were held violative of
Arizona's Uniformity Clause (ARIz.
CONST. art. 9, §1 provides "all taxes
shall be uniform upon the same class
of property") and Exemptions Clause
(ARIz. CONST. art. 9, §2 provides
"[piroperty in the State not exempt
under the laws of the United States
or under the Constitution ... shall be
subj ect to taxation"). 12  The
Legislature moved quickly and
Arizona no longer imposes property
taxes on possessory interests in pub-
licly owned property; rather, a
Government Property Lease Excise
Tax ("GPLE"), which applies favor-
ably to publicly owned arenas and
stadiums, has been enacted (ARIz.
REV. STAT. §42.6201 et seq.).
Arizona's Uniformity Clause and
Exemption Clause do not apply to
excise taxes.
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4. As on several other occasions
previously referred to, Dial once
again played an important role by
agreeing to provide the construction
cost overrun guaranty. No conces-
sionaire bidding for exclusive
arrangements at the Arena (other
than Restaura) was willing to
assume that risk.
5. We were not able to find any
model or structure similar to the
arrangements negotiated and
entered into with respect to the
America West Arena. Since complet-
ing the America West Arena, I have
run into more clones of our docu-
ments than I can keep track of (most
of our documents are public record).
I was hired in the spring of 1996 by
the Miami Heat to prepare the ini-
tial documentation for a new arena
to be developed for by the NBA
Miami Heat and the NHL Florida
Panthers. Shortly after my arrival
in Miami, the tentative agreement
between the teams fell apart. Eric
Woolworth, General Counsel of the
Heat, Bruce J. Colan, a partner at
Holland & Knight, and I began
drafting documents for the develop-
ment of a downtown Miami basket-
ball arena, while the Panthers and
their lawyers were working on a
new hockey arena in Broward
County. Those involved with each of
the facilities kept a close eye on the
progress of both projects. In one of
the final drafts of the hockey arena
operating agreement, someone
failed to catch the provision that
"Jerry Colangelo" was to maintain
control of the operator at all times.
While it was obvious to everyone
familiar with either project that the
America West Arena documents
were being used for both projects,
this oversight in drafting provided a
much-needed lighter moment.
6. When the Arena was under
design, a great deal of consideration
was given to the playing and per-
formance areas for the wide array of
anticipated events. After Jerry con-
firmed with the National Hockey
League that the sport was not des-
tined for Phoenix in the near term, it
was decided to place the basketball
court in the center of the bowl. This
provided for removable seats in order
to expand playing and performance
areas to one end of the Arena for
sporting events and exhibitions
requiring added space (such as arena
football, arena soccer, ice events,
large family shows, and hockey). A
great deal of consideration was also
given to advertising by hiring a high-
ly regarded consultant to make sure
that the maximum amount of appro-
priate prime advertising space was
incorporated in the design of the Arena.
7. From virtually the outset,
the America West Arena outper-
formed revenue projections; unfortu-
nately, it also proved more costly to
operate than estimated. While the
Arena operated at a level sufficient
to satisfy the priority payment to the
City, participation in net cash flow
would be deferred beyond the City's
expectations. Discussions began
immediately with the City and, while
underway, newspaper headlines
trumpeted that the America West
Arena was underperforming for the
City. Even though the economic pro-
jections had been carefully qualified
and reviewed by consultants, Jerry
moved quickly by agreeing that the
City could temporarily share in pay-
ments going to the franchise (its fees
from advertising and suites) until
performance of the Arena was
improved, at which time the sharing
arrangement would terminate and the
City would repay the Suns. This is a
good example of Jerry's philosophy
about doing what has to be done to
make business arrangements work out
to everyone's reasonable expectations.
8. Throughout negotiations
with the City, including the financ-
ing of the Arena, relationships were
cordial and one could sense a great
deal of trust between the City (both
elected and appointed officials) and
the Suns organization. As was the
case with the investors in the pur-
chase of the Suns franchise, the City
clearly relied on Jerry and his lead-
ership and credibility that was being
counted on to make the Arena a suc-
cess. Accordingly, the various agree-
ments with the City included certain
restrictions on Jerry's transferring
control of or selling the franchise or
the developer/operator. The America
West Arena is and, I believe, will
continue to be an outstanding example
of public/private sector cooperation in
providing the community a much-
needed and much-utilized facility.
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9. The agreements between the
Suns and the City were unique at the
time. The NBA had no experience
with these kinds of arrangements.
Accordingly, the City of Phoenix
required our legal opinion that no
rule, regulation, or policy of the NBA
was violated by the arrangements.
NBA rules and regulations were easy
to verify; policy, on the other hand,
existed only in minutes of the meet-
ings of the Board of Governors of the
NBA, available for inspection only in
the Association's New York offices.
It took me three days to get through
the minute books. To be able to fol-
low the major events in the history of
the NBA from inside the boardroom
To pave the way for the Phoenix Coyotes,
a binding letter of intent was entered into
between the hockey team, the develop-
er/operator of the Arena, and the Phoenix
Suns. This letter of intent obligated the
parties to use their best efforts to enter
into definitive agreements and obtain all
necessary approvals, consents and modifi-
cations to existing agreements in order toimplement certain understandings.
1h Arena and the hockey team, as a
pie licensee of the Arena, would enter
into a license agreement for the play of all
home, exhibition, preseason regular sea-
son and play-off games at the Arena. The
license agreement would be for an initial
term of five seasons, with two five-year
renewal terms, if elected by the NHL
team. License fees were established for
the initial and renewal terms, together
with reimbursement for certain game day
and related costs incurred by the Arena,
not to exceed a cap.
9,hockey team retained the exclusive
r to sell and control the sale of tick-
ets for hockey events, subject to a ticket
distribution agreement entered into by
the Arena. The hockey team also was given the exclusive
right to establish prices and control the sale of tickets for the
suites and to receive all revenues therefrom. The team was
given the right to one private suite for its use for all Arena
events and the exclusive use of another suite for hockey
games. If suite licensees chose not to purchase tickets for
hockey games, the hockey team and the developerloperator
were to cooperate in obtaiining the permission ofsuch suite
licensees to permit the use of the suites by third parties.
QArena agreed, at its sole cost and expense, to make cer-
J9 improvements in order to provide a venue complying
with NHL standards and consistent in quality with the
material and workmanship provided to the Suns (in areas
such as locker rooms, coaches' rooms, etc.). The develop-
er/operator would be entitled to reimbursement of these
expenses if the hockey team left the Arena before the
improvements were fully amortized.
4 hockey team was provided access to all existing facili-
1necessary for NHL hockey game use, including the box
office, media lounge, wives and family lounge, training facil-
ities, medical room and officials room. Access and use of all
other facilities at the Arena would be made available to the
hockey teami on the same basis as available to the Suns,
with office space to be offered when available in the Arena
or ancillary buildings controlled by the Arena.
was fascinating. As Jerry had assured
me, no policies of the NBA were con-
travened by our deal with Phoenix.
SfOK'S EXFANSION
While the basketball franchise
was a great anchor tenant for the
Arena and while Bob Machen was
immediately successful in attracting
commitments for family shows, ice
events, concert bookings, and other
events, Jerry began investigating
other indoor sports that might add
reliable events at the venue. An
affiliate of the Suns bought into
World Team Tennis, indoor soccer,
and arena football. Tennis and soc-
cer did not work out in Phoenix,
notwithstanding three years of effort
and substantial investment. Arena
football, on the other hand, almost
immediately became and continues
to be wildly popular with a very loyal
cadre of fans. At a nominal cost, the
Arizona Rattlers franchise has
become a great investment. The suc-
cess of the Rattlers is illustrative of
Jerry's approach to professional
sports. One of his first moves was to
hire Danny White as the first and
only General Manager and Head
Coach. Danny is a product of Arizona
and Arizona State University and
was the successor to Roger Staubach
in leading the Dallas Cowboys to
many successful seasons. Jerry's
second move was to delegate respon-
sibility for developing the franchise
to his son, Bryan. Bryan and Danny
White have been honored by the
Arena Football League as Executive
of the Year and Coach of the Year
respectively. As a result of a coordi-
nated marketing strategy,1 5 virtual-
ly every game has been a sellout and
the franchise has received the AFL
Commissioner's Award on two occa-
sions as the best indoor football
organization in the League. Bryan's
emergence from the long shadow of
his father began with the success of
the Rattlers. Bryan now also heads
up the Suns organization. He still
remembers with more than just a lit-
tle satisfaction that he presented
Jerry with his first professional
sports championship ring.
In late 1995, Jerry was approached
on the subject of bringing the
National Hockey League to Phoenix.
Several businessmen were in negotia-
tions to purchase the Winnipeg Jets
franchise and move it to a more
promising market. In meetings
between Jerry and the new own-
ers, arranged by Gary Bettman,
Commissioner of the NHL, a rough
outline was prepared to bring the
hockey team to Phoenix and the
America West Arena. The success of
NHL hockey in the Sun Belt since
has catapulted Phoenix and the
Arena parking garage was available to the hockey team
Jockey game days at rates specified by the hockey team.
Ali parking revenues (net of direct operating costs) were to
be paid o the hockey team-
repect to signage and sponsorship, base advertising
,Vnues (including scheduled increases) would be deter-
lined with respect to all existing advertising in the Arena.
The Suns would continue to negotiate new advertising
agreements and replacement advertising agreements for
such space, with the hockey team receiving any increase.
Exclusive arrangements were protected nd advertising in
new space (or based on new technologies) would be shared
on an equitable basis to be agreed upon. Advertising space
on the upper fascia within the bowl of the Arena (between
the two levels of suites) was assigned to the hockey team for
the sale of fixed and permanent, advertising. Tekmporaryadvertising at hockey games also would go to the hockey team.
'r chockey team was given the right to elect to participate
if sales of" merchandise, novelties and publications, togeth-
er with the Suns and the Arizona Diamondbacks through a
limited liability company to be formed with stores at the
Arena, the Bank One Ballpark (under construction) andother locations.
Q developeroperator agreed to use its best efforts to assist
iockey team in negotiating a separate concession agree-
ient with Restaura. The cost of carving out a direct inter-
est in concessions for the hockey team was split between
Restaura and the developer/operator.
Suns and the developerloperator agreed to make avail-
their marketing, advertising, ticket sales and promo-
tionl staffs to the hockey team on a fee basisi order to
save the hockey team overhead costs with respect to its
staffing of these functions, Where the Suns and the devel-
oper/operator benefited from exclusive relationships with
service providers, best efforts would be made to extend sim-
ilar arrangements to the hockey team.
ey team retained exclusive rights to control all
b ,s and telecasts of its games and all existing trans-
missin: and production facilities at the Arena were avail-
able for its use.
h ling of NBA and NHL games would share the same
Iiorj% both subject to long-term arrangements for other
events entered into by the Arena.
i Qa revenues to be paid to or retained by the hockey
e deemed revenues of the hockey team and not rev
enues of the Arena or subject to any distribution formula
under any agreement to which the Arena, the Suns, the
City, Fuji Bank, etc., were parties.
America West Arena to the fore as a
promising market and venue.
Several factors brought the NHL
to Phoenix. The NHL team wanted
to be more than a mere licensee at
the America West Arena. In future
marketing, the Arena would be
referred to and identified as the
home of the Phoenix Suns and the
NHL team. In addition, the new
hockey team owners required certain
interests in Arena revenues; howev-
er, unlike the Suns and the develop-
er/operator, those revenues were not
at risk by being subordinated to oper-
ating expense, debt service, the
City's priority payments, payments
to the Suns for advertising and
suites, or any of the other priorities
established for the disbursement of
Arena revenues. The shortcomings
of the America West Arena as a
venue for hockey were well known at
the outset of negotiations. The
Arena had hosted a number of NHL
exhibition games which established
the capacity of the Arena for NHL
hockey at approximately 16,500 due
to the problems of impaired sight-
lines at the expanded end of the play-
ing surface.
On December 12, 1995, the parties
entered into two binding letters of
intent. An abbreviated letter of
intent obligated Jerry to negotiate
definitive agreements to bring the
NHL hockey team to the America
West Arena and obtain all necessary
consents and approvals. Jerry
agreed to assist the hockey team in
obtaining sponsors, advertisers, local
radio and television stations, and
service providers. The agreement
also recited Jerry's right to purchase
a 5 percent limited partnership inter-
est in the NHL team on terms and
conditions to be agreed upon-failure
to reach agreement in this respect
would not relieve the hockey team or
the America West Arena of their
agreements. We insisted on adding
to the letter of intent a statement
concerning Jerry's positions as the
controlling shareholder of each of the
general partners of the Suns and its
affiliates and of the Diamondbacks
and its affiliates; consistent there-
with, Jerry's obligations to the hock-
ey team were to be subject to and to
be performed consistent with his
fiduciary duties owed to the entities
he controlled and their investors.
RELATIONS COOL
WITH THE NHL
Negotiation of the definitive docu-
ments with the hockey team (to
become the Phoenix Coyotes) were
protracted and, at times, very diffi-
cult.1 6 Relationships between the
parties became somewhat strained.
Definitive documents were signed in
June of 1995. No agreement was
reached with respect to Jerry becom-
ing a limited partner in the Phoenix
Coyotes. The relationships between
the Coyotes and the Arena have con-
tinued to decline. While the Coyotes
franchise has been successful in gen-
erating very good fan support in
Phoenix, it has experienced operat-
ing losses. Among the causes it has
publicly identified are the reduced
capacity of the Arena for hockey
events, obstructed view seating,
problems with suite licensees (this
season, approximately 7 suites at the
Arena do not participate in the
Coyotes season and do not permit the
Coyotes to license others for the use
of the suites), and limited participa-
tion in Arena revenues.
Dissatisfied with its venue, the
hockey franchise has entered into an
agreement with Scottsdale (which
borders Phoenix on the east) and
developers for a new hockey arena
there. The project goes before the
voters of Scottsdale in May of this
year. The City and the Arena have
recently announced plans to expand
the Arena's capacity for hockey and
similar events and to alleviate, to a
significant extent, the problems with
obstructed seating. The cost of this
project is estimated to be $12 mil-
lion. 17 With respect to participation
in Arena revenues, there is obviously
a point beyond which the develop-
er/operator, its lenders, the City and
the Suns cannot go, especially if the
Coyotes franchise continues to insist
that its Arena revenues not be at risk
to costs of operations and other com-
mitments. 18 In the end analysis, the
Phoenix Coyotes suffers from
increasing player contract demands
(as does all of professional sports)
and inadequate revenues at the
National Hockey League level-one
need only compare the NHL to pro-
fessional football, basketball, and
baseball with respect to shared
league revenues in order to appreci-
ate the problem.
THE MERCURY TAKE THE COURT
While the Arena has had a diffi-
cult relationship with the Phoenix
Coyotes, the Women's National
Basketball Association, as would be
expected, has been a different story.
When NBA Commissioner David
Stern first discussed establishing a
professional women's basketball
league, with Jerry, Jerry was imme-
diately supportive, feeling that the
time was right. The WNBA is not
organized in the same manner as the
NBA. The NBA owns the WNBA and
enters into long term operating and
revenue sharing arrangements with
NBA teams and their venues to
organize WNBA teams and operate
them. Players contract directly with
the WNBA and are subject to a team
selection process that seeks to assure
competitiveness throughout the
League. The WNBA kicked off its
initial season with eight teams,
including the Phoenix Mercury.
Jerry prepared to enter women's pro-
fessional sports by signing up Cheryl
The process of ... assisting
Miller as Head Coach.
Cheryl had been an All inves
American at University of
Southern California, a the
national College Player of
the Year and a leader on keel
the U.S. Women's Basket-
ball Team that won an
America's first Gold
Medal in the sport at the and
1984 Olympics. At the
same time, the marketing mat
departments of the Suns
and the Arena focused on
preparing Phoenix, and OccU]
its fans, advertisers, and
sponsors for women's pro- Bas(
fessional basketball.
Despite predictions and
projections of a slow start
and serious losses for the first sever-
al years of operation, the Phoenix
Mercury took to the basketball court
in 1997 and was an immediate finan-
cial and performance success story.
Like the Rattlers, the Mercury
appear to have a very bright future
in the Phoenix marketplace. Again,
the cornerstone has been solid organ-
ization and management-not only
in the selection of the product and its
marketing, but in the sustainable
development of the franchise by
attracting top coaches and athletes.
"PLAY BALL!"
In the summer of 1993, Jerry
received a visit from Jim Bruner, a
member of the Maricopa County
Board of Supervisors, and Joe
Garagiola, Jr., an attorney in
Phoenix with a deep and abiding
interest in baseball. Both had been
involved with baseball in Arizona
over the years, and wanted Jerry to
lead an effort to solicit an expansion
franchise of Major League Baseball
in Phoenix. Jerry knew if he became
involved, everything would have to
be in place. In the previous round of
Major League Baseball expansion in
tors and their counsel wih
subscription documents; ...
Aing track of commitments
I escrow account deposits
supplementing the offering
erials as significant events
'red affecting Major League
ball, ... made most of 1995
a blur in my memory.
1990, Phoenix had been embarrass-
ingly unprepared. Jerry's visitors
expressed the opinion, which they
said was shared by many others in
the community, that Jerry was the
person who could make it happen.
Jerry was a very successful base-
ball player in high school, receiving a
number of offers from major league
franchises. Though he accepted a
college scholarship at Kansas to play
basketball, his love of baseball
always remained strong. Nonethe-
less, the challenge of bringing Major
League Baseball to Phoenix was for-
midable. It was to be expected that
an expansion team would cost no less
than $100 million, and Phoenix had
no ballpark. In addition, early pro-
posals to deal with the Phoenix sum-
mer heat (such as erecting evapora-
tive cooling towers at Phoenix
Municipal Stadium, the home of the
Triple A Phoenix Firebirds) had
proven totally unsuccessful. Jerry's
visitors had some positive informa-
tion concerning a stadium. In con-
nection with previous attempts to
bring Major League Baseball to
Arizona, the Arizona Legislature had
enacted legislation in 1990 that per-
mitted Maricopa Coun-ty,
through a Stadium
District, to impose a quar-
ter-cent sales tax for
funds to develop a base-
ball-only stadium, if a
Major League Baseball
team were first secured. 19
As Jerry considered
the opportunity, it was
clear that there would be
little room for foot faults.
For the Stadium District
to be formed and the vote
on ballpark funding to
take place, a Major
League Baseball fran-
chise would have to be
committed to Phoenix.
The seed money for
efforts to attract Major League
Baseball and pursue a ballpark
would have to come from the Phoenix
Suns organization. In addition, Jerry
was concerned that Major League
Baseball, for historical and other rea-
sons, faced serious problems in rela-
tionships with its players, in the
competitiveness with other profes-
sional sports, and with its fan sup-
port. On the other hand, there was
also reason to believe success could
be achieved and would be welcomed
by Arizonians. After all, Arizona had
repeatedly demonstrated its infatua-
tion with baseball. At every level,
including the outstanding pro-
grams at Arizona State University
and the University of Arizona,
baseball was popular and success-
ful. In addition, the state and var-
ious communities throughout the
state had worked hard and at no
small expense to develop the Cactus
League as the premier Major League
Baseball spring training program.
More than $160 million of public
funds has been spent on Cactus
League facilities for ten teams that
conduct spring training in Arizona.
Further expansion of the Cactus
League by two additional teams
appears likely. 20 The popularity of
the Cactus League has been impres-
sive from the beginning, not only in
terms of local support, but in draw-
ing winter visitors and capturing sig-
nificant tourism dollars. In addition
to these encouraging developments,
one was tempted to look to our neigh-
bor, Colorado, and Denver's success
as a 1990 Major League Baseball
expansion franchise.
With these thoughts in mind and,
Jerry made the decision to proceed.
Legal work for the project was split.
My assignments were to organize the
Delaware limited partnership and
related entities to acquire the expan-
sion franchise; to prepare materials
for a private offering; and to negoti-
ate and document the Membership
Agreement between Major League
Baseball and the expansion fran-
chise. Another firm would be respon-
sible for negotiations with the
Maricopa County Stadium District
and the development of the ballpark
and related facilities.
In February of 1994, I organized
AZPB Limited Partnership, a
Delaware limited partnership, for
the purpose of owning and operating
a Major League Baseball team to be
awarded to Maricopa County and to
operate a ballpark and related facili-
ties. Jerry already had begun and
we were to follow through on discus-
sions with investors. The objective
was to raise $145 million. The mini-
mum investment was set at
$250,000, with early efforts targeted
at commitments of $5 million and
above. In addition to Jerry's efforts,
primarily in the business communi-
ty, a number of friends and associ-
ates worked nonstop to put together
groups of smaller qualified investors
to participate through limited liabili-
ty companies. 2 1 At the same time,
ballpark design and planning was
proceeding, as were negotiations
with the Maricopa County Stadium
District to develop a memorandum of
understanding and planning for the
enactment of the County-wide sales
tax for the development of the ball-
park. Amid wildly churning contro-
versy over the imposition of the tax
for the ballpark which required no
public vote and several tumultuous
public hearings, the members of the
Maricopa County Board of
Supervisors (sitting as the governing
board of the Maricopa County
Stadium District), authorized the tax
on February 17, 1994, subject to the
prior award of a Major League
Baseball expansion franchise for
Maricopa County and subject further
to a $238 million maximum amount
of tax levy receipts. At the time the
vote was taken, the development
budget for the ballpark was approxi-
mately $278 million.
With the passage of the ballpark
tax provision, the legal work moved
forward on all fronts. After numer-
ous delays, on March 9, 1995, the
Major League Baseball owners
approved expansion franchises for
Phoenix and Tampa. What had been
collected in the way of commitments
by investors now had to be turned
into binding subscriptions and
escrowed funds. On March 24, 1995,
a several-inch-thick Confidential
Private Offering Memorandum for
AZPB Limited Partnership was
released. It covered Major League
Baseball, the expansion franchise
process, the Maricopa County mar-
ket, the ballpark, and other details of
the offering. Distribution of the
Memorandum was limited to known
accredited investors who had
expressed an interest in the opportu-
nity that was being offered.
A detailed subscription agreement
and investor questionnaire were
included with the materials, as was
an extensive background informa-
tion-new ownership application to be
filed with and acted upon by Major
League Baseball.
While we were moving quickly to
review, verify, and complete sub-
scription documents, investment
questionnaires and Major League
Baseball's ownership information
and applications, we were involved
at the same time in detailed discus-
sions and due diligence with Major
League Baseball over the Mem-
bership Agreement. The Mem-
bership Agreement established the
basis on which the expansion fran-
chise had been awarded and set forth
all of the rights, duties, and obliga-
tions of the various parties. Over the
preceding months, I had made sever-
al trips to New York to meet with
Major League Baseball staff mem-
bers and in-house counsel so that we
would be prepared to sign the
Agreement. In addition, we had
reviewed a massive number of docu-
ments and agreements affecting the
franchise. Notwithstanding this
preparation and the detailed infor-
mation that for months had been
shared back and forth, the first draft
of the Membership Agreement sub-
mitted by Major League Baseball
had a host of problems. In the weeks
leading up to the deadline for signing
the Agreement, changes were coming
from and going to New York virtual-
ly nonstop. In addition to dealing
with in-house counsel at Major
League Baseball, we were just being
introduced to outside counsel for the
National League and outside counsel
for the American League, each of
whom had previously unanticipated
concerns with the Agreement.
The Membership Agreement was
entered into as of March 24, 1995,
and established, in accordance with
the franchise award vote, a fee of
$130 million payable in four install-
ments between July 1, 1995, and
November 1, 1997.22 The Agreement
also required equity capital of $32
million by April 18, 1995; $60 million
by July 1, 1996; and $90 million by
the closing date (tied to the expan-
sion draft scheduled for November of
1997 or such other date as agreed
upon by the Commissioner and the
expansion club). The process of
preparing and issuing offering mate-
rials; assisting investors and their
counsel with the subscription docu-
ments and Major League Baseball's
background information form and
ownership application; keeping track
of commitments and escrow account
deposits; and supplementing the
offering materials as significant
events occurred affecting Major
League Baseball, the franchise, and
the ballpark made most of 1995 a
blur in my memory.
IN RETROSPECT
In 1993, I left the law firm of
Lewis and Roca, where I had prac-
ticed for 21 years, and joined the firm
of Meyer, Hendricks, Victor, Osborne
& Maledon. In the spring of 1995,
several of the senior partners in the
firm precipitated a power struggle
which resulted in the dissolution of
the firm. When these events began
to unfold at the law firm, I immedi-
ately met with Jerry. It was a diffi-
cult meeting and the timing could
not have been worse. While I was
prepared to withdraw from the proj-
ect and assist in an orderly transi-
tion of the work, I also was prepared
to see the project through and meet
the critical deadlines which lay
ahead. If ever the loyalty of a client
was tested, this was certainly one of
those moments. While Jerry was
sympathetic, he was obviously con-
cerned for the project. I assured him
that nothing would interfere with
getting the job done. With his sup-
port and encouragement, I went back
to work. Before meeting with Jerry,
I had called a meeting of the key
attorneys who were working on the
project and obtained their commit-
ment to continue their work. As a
result of the distraction of law firm
internal politics and rumors, I ended
up moving our group, together with
secretaries and several paralegals, to
an unoccupied floor of the building.
We had agreed to "play ball" and only
become involved in firm politics to
the extent necessary to protect
careers. One career that did not
need protection was that of Jane
Birge, a very bright and capable
young lawyer. Jane stayed with me
for three years and only left to take a
job with Jerry as the first in-house
lawyer for the basketball and base-
ball organizations, as well as the
Arena and the Ballpark. Jerry also
lured away Melissa Santello, my
legal assistant for eight years.
Dealing with Major League
Baseball was nothing like dealing
with the National Basketball
Association. The NBA, under the
leadership of David Stern, is an
extremely efficient and well-run
organization. While there are dis-
agreements among NBA owners
from time to time, I have not been
aware of any issue which publicly
divided the organization or impaired
the Commissioner's office. If a self-
destructive tendency was near the
surface in the NBA, one surely would
have expected to see evidence of it
during the course of the recently con-
cluded lockout. Major League
Baseball, on the other hand, had no
Commissioner in 1995 and the Major
League Baseball Players Association
was on strike. The Major League
Baseball owners seemed to be much
less cohesive than the NBA owners.
I am sure among those who know
Major League Baseball well-and I
am not one of those-there are his-
torical, structural, and other reasons
that explain why the organization
was difficult to deal with. When I
was in almost daily contact with
Major League Baseball staff, there
was never a dull moment.
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Because no decision on league
assignment was made at the time the
expansion franchises were awarded,
we had to comply not only with the
Major League Baseball Agreement,
rules and regulations, but also with
the Constitutions, Bylaws, rules and
regulations of both the National and
American Leagues. This presented
some interesting problems at times,
since consistency was often lacking.
Within the structure of professional
baseball, certain matters are gov-
erned by each league whereas other
matters are governed by Major
League Baseball (all of the owners in
both leagues, meeting as the govern-
ing body of Major League Baseball).
The Office of Commissioner (vacant
in 1995 but with its powers vested in the
Executive Committee of Major League
Baseball) was kind of a "wild card."
The structure of Major League
Baseball made due diligence espe-
cially difficult. Not only were there a
large number of complex Major
League Baseball documents and
agreements to review, but there were
also the material documents and
agreements of the National League
and American League, as well.
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With the America West Arena
located downtown and Jerry to be in
control of both teams, the location of
the ballpark was designed to be in close
proximity to the Arena. The impact of
the Diamondbacks and the ballpark
(now, pursuant to a long-term naming
agreement, the Bank One Ballpark) on
downtown Phoenix has been and will
continue to be remarkable. 25
The Bank One Ballpark used the
tried and true legal structure devel-
oped for the America West Arena. As
with the Arena, a separate entity
was formed for the development and
operation of the Ballpark. Due to the
size of the project, uncertainties
associated with being a start-up ven-
ture in a new facility and difficulties
encountered in dealing with
Maricopa County (a more challeng-
ing task than dealing with the City of
Phoenix), the Diamondbacks fran-
chise was required to take on greater
risk than the Suns franchise had
undertaken with the Arena.
The Ballpark itself presented well-
publicized architectural and design
challenges. The facility would have
to be enclosed and air conditioned
during the hot Phoenix summers,
while at the same time meet Jerry's
commitment to a natural playing
surface. The result is a facility with
a natural surface and a retractable
roof which can open and close in
approximately six minutes. In every
respect, the Ballpark is state-of-the-
art for fans and game participants.
Every detail from sight lines and
seating, concessions and restaurants,
public amenities and aesthetics was
carefully considered. In addition, the
Ballpark was designed to accommo-
date advertising and other revenue-
generating opportunities. 2 6  The
Ballpark has immediately established
itself as one of Phoenix's landmarks.
While modern and innovative in
many of its design and construction
concepts, it retains a traditional feel.
Major League Baseball, the
National and American Leagues, the
expansion franchise, the expansion
franchise process, and the Ballpark
would have been difficult enough to
explain in private placement offering
materials under normal circum-
stances. Unfortunately, the situa-
tion in 1995 was anything but nor-
mal and predictable. We were con-
stantly assessing new developments
with Major League Baseball as a
result of the player strike and the
vacant Commissioner's office.
Development of the team and the
increasing costs of the Ballpark had
to be carefully tracked, as well. On
several occasions, the offering mate-
rials were supplemented to keep
investors and prospective investors
fully informed.
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Major League Baseball, the
National League, and the American
League prohibit any owner of an
interest in a franchise from lending
money to any other franchise or the
owners, players, and personnel of
any other franchise. Four investors
in the Diamondbacks franchise were
large lending institutions with major
offices in the Greater Metropolitan
Phoenix area. They represented
commitments to the capital of the
limited partnership of $20 million.
The problems posed by the rules con-
cerning their participation as
investors (presumably a credit card
issued to a player on another team
could trigger a violation) was raised
with Major League Baseball in 1994.
In what has to be one of my most
frustrating experiences, it took until
June of 1995, for Major League
Baseball, the National League, and
the American League to approve an
exception we suggested for small
noncontrolling ownership interests
held by banking and banking-related
businesses with respect to transac-
tions entered into in the ordinary
course of business. Given past scan-
dals, it is understandable that base-
ball would have strict rules regard-
ing the lending of money and gam-
bling, but the delay in getting the
owners to adopt what appeared to be
an easy "fix" was maddening.
2 8
While our lending institutions con-
tributed their funds to the escrow
account, they would not approve
unconditional release of their funds
until the rules were changed.
The April 18, 1995, deadline for equity
capital established in the Membership
Agreement had to be extended three
times until July 1, 1995.
Beginning in early 1995, we were
reporting investment commitments
on a regular basis to the staff at
Major League Baseball. At the out-
set, Jerry had established $250,000
as the minimum investment. While
most of our committed capital was
attributable to investors of $5 million
or more, a substantial amount of
money was raised from among
wealthy individuals who formed lim-
ited liability companies for the pur-
pose of purchasing one or more limit-
ed partnership units for $5 million
per unit. After the award of the fran-
chise and signing of the Membership
Agreement, the Major League
Baseball owners determined that the
minimum investment could be no
less than $500,000 by each individ-
ual and business investor. A busi-
ness entity formed for the purpose of
investing in the franchise would not
be approved unless each member or
shareholder contributed the mini-
mum $500,000 amount. Having
accepted investments in the amount
of $250,000 (subject to Major League
Baseball approval) at the last
minute, we had to offer each small
investor the opportunity to withdraw
their commitment or increase it to
the newly-established minimum con-
tribution amount. In addition, we had
to notify all investors of the change in
the rules and apprise them of the effect
of the change on capital contributions.
The NBA requires various levels
of background investigation, depend-
ing on the size of the ownership
interest and participation in man-
agement. This always seemed like a
reasonable policy to me, since it was
unlikely that a franchise or the sport
would be tarnished by something in
the background of a small passive
investor. Major League Baseball's
requirements were far more burden-
some and restrictive. The expense and
delay occasioned by the Major League
Baseball procedures were substantial.
On March 31, 1998, as scheduled,
Bank One Ballpark opened and the
Arizona Diamondbacks took the
field. The inaugural season is histo-
ry. The Diamondbacks got off to a
miserable start, but played the last
part of the season at better than 500.
Attendance was at the top of Major
League Baseball. The Bank One
Ballpark ended up costing approxi-
mately $350 million (with some costs
still in arbitration); and that amount,
together with the franchise fee and
the costs of establishing a farm sys-
tem and the team, account for, give
or take a few million, a half-a-billion-
dollar enterprise. As the Diamond-
backs prepare for their second Major
League Baseball season, the excite-
ment of being a contender has
replaced the excitement of being the
new kid on the block.
BUILDING THE FAN BASE
Greater Metropolitan Phoenix is
now one of a handful of communities
across the country which hosts fran-
chises of the four major professional
sports organizations, and Jerry has
been instrumental in bringing and
keeping three of them here. It has
been an exciting 12 years since he
telephoned me about buying the
Suns franchise. It has been an unfor-
gettable experience with a truly
remarkable man. Jerry started out
in Chicago and made his way into
high school and college basketball
and baseball as a "jock." An early
failure in business led him to follow
up on a suggestion to contact Dick
Klein. Dick Kein hired Jerry to help
put together the Chicago Bulls, after
previous failures of professional bas-
ketball to take hold in the Windy
City. When Jerry hit the ground in
Phoenix with the Phoenix Suns in
1969, who would have guessed what
was to follow.
While he has turned opportunity
into tremendous success, his most
enduring qualities are revealed in
the sentiments he has expressed on a
number of important occasions. The
message is simple. I have heard it
delivered to more than 350,000 fans
in front of the America West Arena
after the Suns came so close to beat-
ing the Bulls in 1993;29 to the fans
crowding Bank One Ballpark on
opening day for the Diamondbacks;
and, most recently, to the sell-out
crowd at the Suns first home game of
this lockout-shortened season:
"I want to thank you for your sup-
port. You owe us nothing. It is up to
us to earn your support, and we'll do
everything we can to do just that."
When Jerry expresses these senti-
ments, they sound sincere-because
they are sincerely spoken. *
1 In the early years of the franchise, Jerry hired Tom
Ambrose as Vice President of Public Relations. Tom's duties
included organizing the Suns in support of the community and
community efforts. Today, Tom's duties include staffing Suns
Charities, which donates several million dollars a year to
worthwhile community causes, as well as for community
involvement by the Diamondbacks.
2 It was evident from my first contacts with the NBA that
Gary Bettman (now Commissioner of the National Hockey
League), Jeff Mishkin (now Chief Legal Officer of the NBA),
Joel Litvin (now General Counsel of the NBA) and their staff
attorneys would be helpful beyond my expectations. The same
is true whenever I have had to deal with outside counsel for
the NBA at the Proskauer Rose LLP law firm.
3 John Teets pointed out that Jerry had always been given
great latitude in running the team. Donald Pitt, the Suns
Managing Partner, stated in 1982 on the occasion of Jerry's
selection for the second time as NBA Executive of the Year:
"We look forward to Jerry Colangelo being the general manag-
er of the Phoenix Suns as long as he's in professional basket-
ball. The key to the success of the Suns, we feel, is stability.
The Phoenix Suns is one of the few sports franchises that has
not changed ownership, has not changed cities, and has not
changed general managers. The top-to-bottom stability of the
Suns organization is remarkable in light of the transient
nature of pro sports management. We consider Jerry to be
the premier executive in basketball, if not all of professional
athletics. He exemplifies as a leader what every business
organization, particularly sports organizations, desires to have
at its helm."
4 In July of 1993, the franchise entered into a favorable
restructuring of its long-term debt. Through the restructuring
and the utilization of net cash from operations, the
Partnership distributed to all partners their adjusted capital
accounts and the guaranteed return on investment. The
General Partner's interest increased from 1 to 25 percent. In
1996, the Partnership redeemed the interests of Viad Corp,
successor to the 25 percent interest in the Suns of The Dial
Corp. (formerly Greyhound), and the General Partner's inter-
est increased to approximately 36 percent.
5 The Phoenix Suns franchise is estimated by those in the
industry to be worth $200 million.
6 The Greater Metropolitan Phoenix area ranks 19 th in size
within the NBA. According to NBA statistics, over the past
ten years the Suns have averaged 11th in attendance. In four
of those ten years, the franchise ranked in the top five in the
NBA in merchandise sales.
7 For the period 1993-1998, the America West Arena aver-
aged in excess of 190 events per year.
8 On October 3, 1989, the voters of Phoenix approved a limit
of $3 million in public fund expenditures to construct or aid in
the construction of any arena, without approval of the elec-
torate. Phoenix, AZ CODE Ch. XXVII (1969).
9 In Point Resorts, Inc. v. Culbertson, 158 Ariz. 137, 761
P.2d 1041 (1988), the Arizona Supreme Court held that a
trade of publicly owned land in the Phoenix Mountain
Preserve for 34 acres of privately held land was sufficiently
completed prior to the effective date of a measure adopted by
special election prohibiting the selling or trading of Mountain
Preserve property.
10 Harry Pfeifer, a partner at Lillick and Charles in San
Francisco, represented The Fuji Bank. Harry not only repre-
sented his client in outstanding fashion, but at times lent
assistance to the other parties in resolving their differences.
Stuart Meislik with the legal department at The Dial Corp
represented Restaura, Inc., and was also of great assistance.
Bob Matia, with the Phoenix office of Squire Sanders &
Dempsey, represented the City with respect to its financing of
the project.
11 On March 1, 1998, the Arena was refinanced on very
favorable terms through the issuance of Phoenix Industrial
Development Authority bonds insured by Ambac. Jim
Pitman, Chief Financial Officer of the Suns, and Paige
Peterson, Chief Financial Officer for the Arena, were in
charge of the project and, while there were a few anxious
moments as interest rates fluctuated, their timing was excel-
lent.
12 In an unpublished and unappealed ruling in January
1993, the Arizona Tax Court invalidated exemptions from the
property tax applicable to possessory interests. ARIZ. REV.
STAT. §42-684 (1998).
13 In order to appreciate the impact property taxes can have
on arenas and stadiums, one need only look to the consterna-
tion and concern in the wake of a recent Florida decision,
Sebring Airport Auth. v. McIntyre, 718 So.2d 296 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1998). That decision, which is being appealed, would
subject stadiums and arenas owned by cities and sports
authorities to property taxes. The decision is on appeal.
See Arena Taxes Give Florida Fits, STREET AND SMITH'S SPORTS
BUSINESS JOURNAL, Feb. 1-7, 1999, at 7.
14 In 1996, Bob Machen was named Manager of the Year by
FACILITIES MAGAZINE, which also conferred its Prime Site
award on the Arena in 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998. The
Arena was named Best New Concert Venue by POLLSTER
MAGAZINE in 1992. In 1996, the Arena was named the
Foremost Sports Facility at Sports Summit, a convention of
sports industry professionals.
15 In 1991, Ray Artigue joined the Suns to coordinate the
marketing function. Within the Suns organization, Ray has
established "Standing Room Only" which not only markets the
Suns, the Arena, the Diamondbacks and Bank One Ballpark,
but an impressive number of unrelated businesses.
16 Fortunately, Jac Sperling, a partner with Hogan and
Hartson in Denver, represented the Coyotes and helped to
work through the tough issues.
17 See $12 Mil. Upgrade for AWA, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Mar.
12, 1999.
18 A group of California investors headed up by Barry Kemp,
an investor in the Suns, has offered to purchase the Phoenix
Coyotes and keep them at the America West Arena. See
Group Bids for Coyotes, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Mar. 18, 1999.
19 ARIZ. REV. STAT. §48-420, et seq. (1998). The legislation
was news to Jerry, who, in 1990, was consumed by the
Phoenix Suns and the America West Arena.
20 See A Big Spring Pitch, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Mar. 13, 1999.
21 Jerry's partners in the Suns and in real estate invest-
ments, Mel Shultz and David Eaton, provided invaluable
assistance, as did Eddie Lynch of Westcor Partners. Dale
Jensen, a transplant from Nebraska who had been very suc-
cessful creating banking software, not only became a substan-
tial investor, but worked to bring others on board.
22 Investors subscribing to Units were permitted to con-
tribute in installments timed to meet the payment obligations
to Major League Baseball for the expansion franchise.
23 1 never received less than cordial and helpful assistance
from the staff at Major League Baseball. In particular, Tom
Ostertag, General Counsel, and Chris Tully, a staff attorney,
were a pleasure to deal with. The difficulty and the frustra-
tion would occur when, what I would consider to be staff deci-
sions, could not be made without first obtaining the vote of
one or more committees of owners.
24 The material documents and agreements identified in
exhibits to the Membership Agreement numbered in excess of
50, all of which required detailed examination.
25 Shortly before the opening of the Ballpark, we formed a
limited liability company to provide facility personnel to both
the Arena and the Ballpark. By combining the staffing for
both facilities, we were able to increase the number of full
time positions for the facilities, avoid duplication of personnel
and put in place a better trained and more cost effective work
force.
26 As opportune as the timing was for the construction of the
Arena, the Ballpark came along when the construction indus-
try in Arizona was booming. As a result, competition for the
project, while active, did not present the same cost saving
opportunities as were enjoyed by the Arena.
27 The private placement offering closed when $145 million
in capital was achieved. The Phoenix Suns acquired one unit
for $5 million and one-half unit for the risks assumed in fund-
ing the early efforts to sign up investors to attract an expan-
sion franchise and to deal with the Maricopa County Stadium
District. The Suns also were repaid the funds which had been
advanced, plus interest. In excess of 50 business and individ-
ual investors were approved by Major League Baseball.
28 As we became increasingly concerned that our lending
institutions might be disqualified, inquiry began into the own-
ership of other franchises. In Toronto (with the Blue Jays)
and Pittsburgh (with the Pirates), several large banks were
substantial investors.
29 Jerry was honored for the fourth time as NBA Executive
of the Year in 1993. No other executive has won the award
more than twice.
